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McCain: Perez v. City of Roseville

NOTE
PEREZ V. CITY OF ROSEVILLE:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR
THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE IN
MATTERS PERTAINING TO SEX
ALLYSON M. MCCAIN*
INTRODUCTION
The late Judge Reinhardt posited the following:
As a society, we must remain solicitous of the constitutional liberties
of public employees, as of any citizens, to the greatest degree possible,
and should be careful not to allow the State to use its authority as an
employer to encroach excessively or unnecessarily upon the areas of
private life, such as family relationships, procreation, and sexual conduct, where an individual’s dignitary interest in autonomy is at its
apex. Nor can or should we seek to eliminate the development of ordinary human emotions from the workplace where we spend a good part
of our waking hours, unless such development is incompatible with
the proper performance of one’s official duties.1

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the relationship between the
government’s interests as an employer and the employee’s interest in
personal autonomy in Perez v. Roseville. In Perez, probationary police
officer Janelle Perez was terminated after an internal affairs investigation
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2021. B.A.
Government, California State University, Sacramento, May 2007. Executive Research Editor, 20192020, Golden Gate University Law Review. The author would like to thank Professor Eric
Christiansen and the entire Golden Gate University Law Review staff for their invaluable guidance
and assistance in the writing and editing of this Note.
1
Perez v. Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech.,
339 F.3d 1158, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003)), superseded by, 926 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2019).
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revealed that she engaged in an off-duty, extramarital affair with another
officer.2 In her subsequent claim against the City of Roseville, Perez argued that the termination violated her rights to privacy and intimate association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it
was partially based upon the department’s disapproval of her off-duty
sexual conduct.3
In its initial decision, the Ninth Circuit held that taking adverse action against an employee based only on moral disapproval of their private sexual conduct violates their constitutionally protected privacy and
intimate association rights.4 Discipline, including termination, is only appropriate upon a showing that the employee’s conduct affects their onthe-job performance, or otherwise violates a narrowly-tailored, constitutionally valid departmental policy.5
Following the publication of the original decision, Judge Reinhardt,
the opinion’s author, passed away.6 The Ninth Circuit thereafter issued a
replacement opinion that draws a contrary conclusion.7 This Note demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit’s original opinion properly interpreted the
facts and the law with regard to the freedoms of privacy and intimate
association. By re-deciding this issue, the Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to clarify the appropriate relationship between the interests of the
government employer and the personal autonomy rights of its employee.
A person should not have to sacrifice aspects of their constitutional rights
to personal autonomy when they accept a position with a government
employer.8
Section I of this Note summarizes both of the Ninth Circuit’s opinions in the Perez matter. Section II analyzes the need to prevent the government employer from intruding on its employees’ personal autonomy
rights. Section III discusses why the court’s second opinion is problematic. Section IV demonstrates why the Ninth Circuit’s first opinion is an
appropriate application of the law considering the facts of the case. Sec2
Perez v. Roseville, No. 2:13-CV-2150-GEB-DAD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80060, at *5-6
(E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 926 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2019).
3
Perez, 882 F.3d at 848.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 855-56; see also Thorne v. El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 471 (9th Cir. 1983).
6
Perez v. Roseville, 926 F.3d at 525-526 (9th Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit held that an
opinion can be amended or withdrawn at any point before the mandate has issued. Carver v. Lehman, 558 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2009). Because the initial Perez opinion “was only part way through its
finalization process,” the court had the authority to withdraw the opinion, and issue a replacement.
Perez, 926 F.3d at 525 (quoting Carver, 558 F.3d at 878). However, Judge Reinhardt himself opined
that, in the interest of “maintaining the stability and legitimacy of the court’s decisions,” a new
majority that disagrees with a court decision should only seek to correct that decision through the en
banc process. Carver, 558 F.3d at 880-81 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
7
Perez, 926 F.3d at 525–26.
8
See Perez, 882 F.3d at 847.
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tion V argues that the test furthered by the first Perez decision should be
used as a standard going forward. Finally, Section VI illustrates how
competing decisions in other circuits would have been decided under the
Perez framework.
I. PEREZ V. ROSEVILLE AND POLICING SEXUAL PRIVACY
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution limits the ability
of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to incidentally or intentionally restrict the liberties government employees enjoy as
private citizens.9 While government employment necessarily includes
certain limitations on individual freedoms, “a citizen who works for the
government is nonetheless a citizen.”10
In Perez v. City of Roseville, Janelle Perez challenged the district
court’s grant of qualified immunity to her commanding officers.11 The
officers, after investigating a false accusation of on-duty sexual conduct,
terminated Perez based on their discovery of her extramarital affair with
a fellow officer.12
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit initially confirmed that, while the district court’s finding that the investigation into Perez’s affair was warranted, it erred by failing to consider whether Perez’s subsequent
termination violated her constitutional rights.13 The Ninth Circuit initially concluded that the evidence presented a genuine factual dispute of
whether Perez’s commanding officers terminated her employment based,
at least in part, on their moral disapproval of her extramarital affair in
violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983.14 The court later withdrew this opinion and replaced it with a decision that reached contrary conclusions.15 In
both opinions, the court reaffirmed the notion that a government employer may not take adverse employment action against an employee
based on private sexual conduct when such conduct does not negatively
affect the employee’s on-the-job performance.16 However, the opinions
9

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006).
Id. (holding that while public employees are entitled to certain protections of their individual liberties, a citizen who speaks in his official capacity as a public employee is not speaking as a
“private citizen” for purposes of First Amendment protection).
11
See Plaintiff-Appellant Janelle Perez’s Opening Brief at 11, Perez, 926 F. 3d 511 (No. 1516430), 2016 WL 3586832.
12
Perez, 882 F.3d at 848.
13
Id. at 858.
14
Id.
15
See Perez, 926 F.3d. 511.
16
See id. at 521; see also Perez, 882 F.3d at 857–58 (citing Thorne, 726 F.2d at 471).
10
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differ on the correct interpretation of the reasoning for Perez’s termination, and how prior precedent should apply.17
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Janelle Perez began working at the Roseville Police Department
(“Department”) in January 2012.18 Shortly after her appointment, Perez
and another department officer, Shad Begley, began a romantic relationship.19 Both Perez and Begley were separated from, though still legally
married to, their respective spouses.20 Approximately six months later,
the Department initiated an internal affairs investigation into Perez’s and
Begley’s conduct after Begley’s estranged wife filed a citizen complaint
suggesting that Perez and Begley engaged in sexual conduct while on
duty.21 Although the officers were romantically involved, the investigation revealed that the allegation of on-duty sexual conduct was false.22
The investigation also revealed that the officers were using their cellular
phones excessively while they were working.23 Captain Moore enlisted
Lieutenant Walstad to review the internal affairs report.24 Walstad determined that Perez’s and Begley’s cell-phone usage violated Department
policy.25 Captain Moore thereafter concluded that Officer Perez should
be terminated in light of the investigation’s findings.26 Both Moore and
Walstad later made comments indicating that they morally objected to
Perez’s extramarital sexual conduct.27
Despite finding no merit to the allegations of on-duty sexual conduct, the Department issued Perez and Begley written reprimands, which
charged them with “Unsatisfactory Work Performance” and “Conduct
Unbecoming.”28 For unknown reasons, Begley’s estranged wife was also
17
18

See Perez, 926 F.3d at 514; see also Perez, 882 F.3d at 848.
Plaintiff-Appellant Janelle Perez’s Opening Brief at 1–2, Perez, 926 F. 3d. 511 (No. 15-

16430).
19

Id.
Perez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80060, at *4.
21
Id. at *5.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at *5–6.
26
Id. at *6
27
Perez, 882 F.3d at 849.
28
Id. at 848–49. The Roseville Police Department’s Policy Manual defines “Unsatisfactory
Work Performance” as “including, but not limited to, failure, incompetence, inefficiency or delay in
performing and/or carrying out proper orders, work assignments or instructions of supervisors without a reasonable and bona fide excuse.” Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and, in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment at n.1, Perez, No. 2:13-CV2150-GEB-DAD, 2015 WL 3833749 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 926 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 1516430), 2015 WL 13688484. “Conduct Unbecoming” refers to conduct that “is unbecoming of a
20
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notified of the charges.29 Three weeks later, Perez appealed her reprimand in an appeal meeting with Chief Daniel Hahn.30 At the meeting,
Perez received a written notice of dismissal, which had been prepared in
advance.31 The department offered no explanation for Perez’s
termination.32
In the three weeks between the written reprimand and Perez’s termination, Perez received a citizen complaint that she was rude and insensitive while responding to a domestic violence call.33 During that time, her
supervisor also reported an incident to Chief Hahn in which Perez questioned her supervisor, and displayed an angry and agitated demeanor.34
Neither report was investigated further.35 However, both incidents provided support for the Department’s proffered reasons for firing Perez—
namely that a complaint was submitted regarding Perez’s conduct during
a service call, and that Perez had exhibited a “bad attitude” toward her
supervisor.36 The department also cited a complaint that Perez “did not
get along well with other female officers” as a reason for her dismissal.37
Nearly a week after her termination, Perez received a revised, written reprimand which reversed the findings of “Unsatisfactory Work Performance” and “Conduct Unbecoming,” but introduced new charges of
“Use of Personal Communication Devices.” The officers’ on-duty phone
use, although a concern, was not one that would “warrant termination.”38
Subsequently, Perez sued the City of Roseville, the Department, and the
officers involved in her termination for infringing her rights to privacy
and free association in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983.39 Perez also
alleged a violation of her right to due process, as well as sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40
member of the Department or which is contrary to good order, efficiency or morale, or which tends
to reflect unfavorably upon the Department or its members.” Id.
29
Perez, 882 F.3d at 849 (9th Cir. 2018) superseded by 926 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2019).
30
Perez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80060, at *6.
31
Id. at *6–7.
32
Plaintiff-Appellant Janelle Perez’s Opening Brief at 9, Perez, 926 F. 3d 511 (No. 1516430).
33
Perez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80060, at *8.
34
Perez, 882 F.3d at 849.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 853.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 855 n.7. Although the officers’ phone records, were deemed “abnormal,” the investigation concluded that they had not texted each other excessively during their shifts. Id. Further,
Chief Hahn himself testified that the phone use alone was “not enough to warrant termination.” Id.
39
Perez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80060, at *29-30.
40
Id.
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B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ORIGINALLY CONCLUDES THAT PEREZ’S
TERMINATION MAY HAVE BEEN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
MOTIVATED.
Initially, the Ninth Circuit held that the court’s precedent set by
Thorne v. City of El Segundo, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in
Lawrence v. Texas governed the Department’s conduct and protected the
employee’s privacy rights.41 The court’s first opinion, however, reached
a different conclusion than more recent jurisprudence in the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits, creating a split in authority.42
1.

Thorne v. El Segundo Sets a Standard for the Protection of
Employee Privacy.

The Ninth Circuit first acknowledged a public employee’s right to
privacy and free association in Thorne v. El Segundo.43 In Thorne, the
City of El Segundo (“City”) denied a clerk-typist within the department a
promotion to police officer.44 An investigation of the denial revealed that
the City forced Thorne to disclose details about her personal sexual matters, and that it ultimately denied Thorne employment based in part on
the nature of such activities.45
The court held that the benefits of public employment do not require
a potential employee to sacrifice her constitutionally protected rights.46
The court noted that the inquiry by the police department involved the
core constitutional guarantees of privacy and free association.47 For this
reason, the City needed to show that its inquiry was narrowly-tailored to
meet a legitimate interest.48 This level of “heightened scrutiny” is essen-

41

Perez, 882 F.3d at 848, 855 N.8.
Compare Perez, 882 F.3d (holding that a government employer may not terminate an employee based on her off-duty sexual conduct, unless such conduct interferes with her work performance or violates a constitutionally valid department policy), with Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528
F.3d 762, 770–72 (10th Cir. 2008), (holding that the asserted liberty interest “to engage in a private
act of consensual sex” was not fundamental, and the City needed only to survive a rational basis
review to restrict the interest), and Coker v. Whittington, 858 F,3d 304, 306–07 (5th Cir. 2017)
(holding that the expansion of rights regarding personal sexual choices promulgated by Lawrence v.
Texas did not warrant a change in public employment policies, and that by accepting the privilege of
public employment, individuals necessarily give up some of their constitutional rights).
43
See generally Thorne, 726 F.2d. 459.
44
Id. at 461–62.
45
Id. at 468.
46
Id. at 469 (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976)).
47
Id.
48
Id.
42
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tial to protect individual liberties from “majoritarian or capricious
coercion.”49
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the City impermissibly denied
Thorne’s employment based in part on its disapproval of her affair with a
married police officer.50 The court thus set the standard for evaluating
the relationship between an employee’s private conduct and her job performance.51 Unless there is evidence that “private, off-duty, personal activities” negatively affect an applicant’s job performance, the State may
not consider such information in its decision to reject an applicant for
employment.52 The court explained that such an intrusion “cannot be upheld under any level of scrutiny.”53
2.

Lawrence v. Texas Further Acknowledges That the Government’s
Conception of Morality Should Not Govern Personal Intimate
Choices.

Thirty years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thorne, the Supreme Court addressed whether the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment54 encompasses “an autonomy of self that includes
freedom [to engage in] certain intimate conduct.”55 In Lawrence v.
Texas, the Court invalidated Texas statute that criminalized “deviate sexual intercourse”56 between two persons of the same sex, but did not
criminalize the same conduct for two persons of different sexes.57
In Lawrence, the Court found that it was inappropriate for the State
to use only majoritarian bias to “mandate [its] own moral code.”58 Thus,
the Court held that “[t]he State cannot demean a . . . person’s existence
or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime.”59 The Court concluded that the Texas statute unconstitutionally
violated Petitioners’ rights under the Due Process Clause because adult
49

Id. at 470 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
Id. at 466 nn.7–8.
51
See id. at 471.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from depriving citizens of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
55
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
56
Texas defines “deviate sexual intercourse” as “any contact between any part of the genitals
of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or . . . the penetration of the genitals or the
anus of another person with an object.” TEX. PENAL CODE §21.01 (2005).
57
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
58
Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
59
Id. at 578.
50
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citizens have a liberty interest in conducting themselves as they choose
with regards to private sexual decision-making.60
The Court did not expressly identify the appropriate standard of review for analyzing an intrusion of an individual’s sexual autonomy.61
However, Justice Kennedy suggested that the Texas law would not survive the minimum rational basis review, by indicating that it “furthers no
legitimate state interest.”62
3. Applying Thorne and Lawrence, the Ninth Circuit Finds Perez’s
Termination Unconstitutional.
Based on the precedent set by Thorne and Lawrence, the court
found that Perez’s private sexual conduct fell within the constitutional
protections of privacy and intimate association, the violations of which
cannot be maintained “under any level of scrutiny.”63 Evidence in the
record sufficiently suggested that Perez’s superiors were motivated to
terminate her, at least in part, by her extramarital affair.64 For example,
Hahn provided inconsistent testimony with regard to whether the investigation into Perez’s affair was a factor in his decision to terminate her.65
Similarly, Moore expressed concern that the affair “could reflect unfavorably on the police department.”66 Walstad also indicated disapproval
of Perez’s private sexual conduct, in light of the fact that both Begley
and Perez “were married and have young children.”67 Additionally, the
court found that, based on the proximity to the internal affairs investigation, the three “reasons” given for Perez’s termination68 could be found
to be pretexts for the true reason for Perez’s termination: disapproval of
her extramarital affair.69
The court further concluded that, while the Roseville Police Department was justified in its investigation due to the allegations of on-duty
60

Id. at 572.
See id. at 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority fails to announce a
specific standard of review).
62
See id. at 578 (2003). Under rational basis review, a law is presumed valid so long as it “is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985).
63
Perez, 882 F.3d at 854 (quoting Thorne, 726 F.2d at 471).
64
Id. at 851.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 852.
67
Plaintiff-Appellant Janelle Perez’s Opening Brief at 4, Perez, 926 F.3d. 511 (No. 1516430).
68
The Department cited the following as reasons for Perez’s termination: (1) she did not get
along with other female officers; (2) the Department received a complaint about her from a domestic
violence victim; and (3) she had a “bad attitude[.]” Perez, 882 F.3d at 853.
69
Id.
61
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conduct, the Department was not permitted to terminate Perez on the
basis of such conduct when it found that Begley’s work-related allegations lacked merit.70 The precedent set by Thorne provided fair notice to
all reasonable police officials that such a termination was not permitted.71 Consequently, neither the Department nor the individual officers
could assert qualified immunity for their subsequent violation.72
For these reasons, the court found that there was sufficient evidence
that the Roseville Police Department violated Perez’s constitutional
rights to privacy and free association, and that the claim should thereby
survive summary judgment.73 Absent any indication that Perez’s off-duty
conduct had a substantial effect on her job performance or violated a
“narrowly tailored department regulation,” the court concluded that the
defendants violated Perez’s constitutional rights by making her extramarital affair the basis for her termination.74
4. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits Differ from The Ninth Circuit’s
Initial Holding.
The Ninth Circuit’s initial opinion differs from recent cases out of
the Fifth and Tenth Circuits.75 In Coker v. Whittington, the Fifth Circuit
resolved that public employees relinquish some of their constitutional
rights in exchange for the privilege of public employment.76 In Coker,
two sheriff’s deputies in Bossier Parish, Louisiana took up residence in
the other’s house and exchanged spouses without first divorcing their
own respective wives.77 The Chief Deputy Sheriff found both officers in
violation of the Sheriff’s Code of Conduct.78 The Code provides that
officers “[shall] not engage in any illegal, immoral, or indecent conduct,
nor engage in any legitimate act which, when performed in view of the
public, would reflect unfavorabl[y] upon the Bossier Sheriff’s Office.”79
The officers were directed to cease living with the other’s spouse, and
warned that a failure to comply would be considered equivalent to a vol70

Id. at 857.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 848. At the summary judgment stage, the judge does not evaluate whether the facts
alleged are true, but whether, taken as true, present a genuine issue of material fact to proceed to
trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
74
Perez, 882 F.3d at 855.
75
See Seegmiller, 528 F.3d. 762; see also Coker, 858 F.3d. 304.
76
Coker, 858 F.3d at 306 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426).
77
Id. at 305.
78
Id.
79
Id.
71
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untary termination.80 The officers filed suit shortly after their
termination.81
The Fifth Circuit found that, despite the expansion of rights involving personal sexual choices recognized in Lawrence, no decisions existed
suggesting that public employees have a right to “associate” with another’s spouse.82 Further, Lawrence does not call for policy changes in
the context of public employment generally.83 Sexual decisions by law
enforcement officers are not comparable to those made by private individuals.84 Since the officers’ conduct could damage the reputation and
credibility of the Sheriff’s Office, and could potentially be used against
the department in litigation, the court found that the order to cease living
with the other’s spouse and subsequent termination for failing to comply
did not violate the officers’ constitutional rights.85
Based on similar reasoning, in Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, the
Tenth Circuit determined that a police department’s decision to reprimand an officer for her private, off-duty sexual activity was not unconstitutional, because it was reasonably related to the department’s interests.86
Officer Sharon Johnson engaged in a brief affair with an officer from a
different department while at a training conference.87 Although an investigation revealed that the affair was consensual, Johnson received a verbal reprimand from the City Manager.88 The content of the reprimand
indicated that Johnson failed to comply with a provision of the law enforcement ethics code that required officers to “keep [their] private lives
unsullied as an example to all and [to] behave in a manner that does not
bring discredit to [the officer] or [the] agency.”89 Further, the City Manager’s reprimand warned Johnson to “avoid the appearance of impropriety” and cautioned that additional violations would result in additional
discipline and/or termination.90
Shortly after these incidents, Johnson resigned from her position
with the LaVerkin City Police Department, believing that her credibility
was significantly compromised as a result of the City’s actions.91 Johnson thereafter sued the City and the City Manager for “infring[ing] on
80

Id. at 306.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See id.
85
Id. at 306–07.
86
Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 764.
87
Id. at 765.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 765–66 (alteration in original) (quoting Aplt App. Vol II, at 337).
90
Id. at 766 (quoting depo. p. 82).
91
Id.
81
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her fundamental liberty interest in sexual privacy,” in violation of her
Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.92
According to the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court has never recognized a broadly defined right to sexual privacy.93 The court noted, however, that the Supreme Court has acknowledged that interests in marital
privacy and bodily integrity are fundamental rights.94 Following in the
footsteps of Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama, the court read the
Lawrence decision as declining to recognize either a fundamental right to
sexual privacy or a “general right to engage in private sexual conduct.”95
Because the court held that Johnson had not established a fundamental right in this case, it subjected the City’s policy to the more lenient
rational basis review, which would require Johnson to show that the purported action was not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.96 The court concluded that the LaVerkin City law enforcement
code could have been reasonably related to the City’s interest in “further[ing] internal discipline or the public’s respect for its police officers
and the department they represent.”97 As such, the City’s encroachment
on Johnson’s privacy interest was not unconstitutional.98
The Ninth Circuit defended its departure from the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits’ rationale by asserting that (a) Thorne is controlling in the Ninth
Circuit, and (b) “the Fifth and Tenth Circuits fail to appreciate the impact
of Lawrence . . . on the jurisprudence of the constitutional right to sexual
autonomy.”99 First, as illustrated in Thorne, the State’s actions must be
analyzed under “heightened scrutiny” because the actions impact Perez’s
“constitutionally protected privacy and associational interests.”100 However, the court noted that such an intrusion could not “survive any level
of scrutiny” under the circumstances of this case.101 Therefore, in order
to receive the appropriate treatment, the right to engage in private sexual
92

Id. at 769.
Id. at 770.
94
Id. at 771 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Due
Process protection of “liberty” includes the right to marital privacy)).
95
Id. (citing Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating
that the Supreme Court resisted the “opportunity to recognize a fundamental right to sexual privacy”
when it was “expressly invited . . . to do so.”)).
96
Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 771. A legitimate purpose is one that is plausibly connected to the
police power of the states. See generally Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State
Enforcement of Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 68 (1993). The states’ police powers include the
regulation of its citizens’ health, welfare, safety and morals. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560,
569 (1991).
97
Seegmiller, 528 F.3d. at 772.
98
Id.
99
Perez, 882 F.3d at 855-56.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 855.
93
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activity free from government interference must either be fundamental,
or else be specifically subject to the type of “heightened scrutiny” described in Thorne. 102
Following the court’s disposition on February 9, 2018, a member of
the court petitioned for en banc rehearing sua sponte,103 and on March
15, 2018, the court instructed the parties to submit briefs as to whether
the matter should be reheard.104 Before he was able to issue a final mandate, Judge Reinhardt, the author of the 2018 opinion, passed away.105
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGES COURSE, AND
AFFIRMS THE DISTRICT COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
1. The Precedent Does Not Clearly Establish Whether Private
Conduct Can Be Relied Upon in an Adverse Employment
Decision.
The court’s 2019 replacement and currently binding opinion relied
on the revised phone-usage reprimand issued to Perez after she was terminated, and concluded that Perez’s extramarital relationship did, in fact,
affect her on-the-job performance.106 The court determined that Perez
was not terminated because of department disapproval of her extramarital affair, but because of her excessive cell phone use in connection with
that affair.107 Further, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Thorne as “explicitly
reject[ing] a per se rule that a police department can never consider its
employees’ sexual relations.”108 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit relied on its decisions in Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Service Board
and Fleisher v. City of Signal Hill.109
In Fugate, two officers were terminated from—and later reinstated
to—their positions with the City of Phoenix Police Department, after an
102

Thorne, 726 F.2d at 470; Perez, 882 F.3d at 855.
Perez, 926 F.3d at 525.
104
Perez v. Roseville, No. 15-16430, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 6544 at *1 (9th Cir. 2018).
105
Perez, 926 F.3d at 525–26. The Ninth Circuit has previously held that an opinion can be
amended or withdrawn at any point before the mandate has issued. Carver, 558 F.3d 869. Because
the initial Perez opinion “was only part way through its finalization process,” the court has the
authority to withdraw the opinion, and issue a replacement. Perez, 926 F.3d at 525 (quoting Carver,
558 F.3d at 878). However, Judge Reinhardt himself opined that, in the interest of “maintaining the
stability and legitimacy of the court’s decisions,” a new majority that disagrees with a court decision
should only seek to correct that decision through the en banc process. Carver, 558 F.3d at 880–81
(Reinhardt, J., concurring).
106
Perez, 926 F.3d at 522–23.
107
See id. at 522.
108
Id. at 520 (citing Thorne, 726 F.2d at 470).
109
Perez, 926 F.3d at 521-22.
103

https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol50/iss1/7

12

McCain: Perez v. City of Roseville

2020]

Perez v. City of Roseville

35

investigation revealed that they had both engaged in sexual relationships
with sex workers while on duty.110 The relationships were not private,
and one sex worker also received city money as a paid informant.111 The
court held that the officers’ constitutional rights to privacy and intimate
association had not been violated because Thorne’s protections did not
extend to conduct that was neither private nor separate from the officers’
on-the-job performance.112
Fleisher involved a probationary officer who was terminated in part
because of private sexual activity that amounted to criminal sexual misconduct.113 Fleisher, when he was 19, engaged in a sexual relationship
with a 15-year-old, as a member of the police department’s “Explorer
Program.”114 Fleisher was later hired as a probationary police cadet, and
was then terminated after an investigation revealed the sexual encounters.115 The City of Signal Hill argued, and the court concluded, that
Fleisher was barred from recovery, because his constitutional rights to
privacy and free association did not protect illegal sexual conduct.116
Taking into consideration Thorne, Fugate, and Fleisher, the court
held that the “precedents are not so clear that every reasonable official
would understand that” considering Perez’s extramarital affair as part of
her termination decision would violate her constitutional privacy rights,
when that relationship led to “inappropriate personal cell phone use
while on the job.”117 Because the precedents are unclear, the court found
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on Perez’s privacy
violation claim.118
2. The Court is Within Its Rights to Substitute a Different Opinion.
The General Orders for the Ninth Circuit provide that if a judge
becomes unavailable while a matter is under submission, and the remaining two judges are not in agreement as to the outcome of the matter,119
110

Fugate v. Phx. Civil Serv. Bd., 791 F.2d 736, 737 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id.
112
Id. at 741.
113
Fleisher v. Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491, 1492–93, 1496 (9th Cir. 1987).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1493.
116
Id. at 1496, 1500.
117
Perez, 926 F.3d at 522.
118
Id. at 514.
119
Judge Tashima filed a concurring opinion in the 2018 matter, stating that he agreed with
the summary judgment reversal, but disagreed with the majority’s reasoning. Perez, 882 F.3d at
861–62 (Tashima, J., concurring). In the 2019 opinion affirming the grant of summary judgment,
Judge Tashima aligned with Judge Ikuta, appointed in Judge Reinhardt’s place, thereby creating a
new majority. Compare Perez v. Roseville, 926 F.3d with 882 F.3d. at 861-65 (Tashima, J.,
concurring).
111
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the Clerk of the Court shall assign a replacement judge to decide the
matter as a quorum.120 Under the precedent established in Carver v. Lehman, the court held that “[u]ntil the mandate has issued, opinions can be,
and regularly are, amended or withdrawn.”121 Because no mandate had
issued on the original decision, and a judge had requested an en banc
rehearing sua sponte, the court was within its authority to withdraw the
initial opinion, and to substitute a new one.122
Incidentally, Judge Reinhardt himself filed a concurring opinion in
Carver, in which he agreed that the remaining judges were within their
authority to withdraw and replace the previous opinion.123 Despite its
clear authority, Judge Reinhardt posited that it was “unwise for a court,
once it has published an opinion on a constitutional question, to change
its mind for so fortuitous and subjective a reason.”124 The en banc125
procedure should be the primary avenue for correcting a decision that the
court believes should be reassessed.126
3. Judge Molloy Dissents: the En Banc Process Is the Proper
Vehicle for Reconsidering a Published Opinion.
Judge Molloy dissented to the 2019 Perez opinion on the grounds
that (1) the majority in the 2018 opinion correctly resolved the matter,
and (2) substituting a different judge when the author of a published
opinion passes away is inappropriate in this case.127
The second of these reasons is particularly problematic for Judge
Molloy, because the en banc rehearing is available specifically “to correct the application of law by a three-judge panel of the Circuit.”128 On a
panel of three judges, two constitute a quorum and are able to decide an
appeal, provided that they agree.129 In this case, Judge Molloy joined in
the majority opinion with Judge Reinhardt in 2018, and Judge Reinhardt’s vote on the matter was published before his death.130 Further,
General Order 3.2(h) does not apply, because “[once] the case is decided
120

U.S. Ct. App. 9th Cir., Gen. Order. 3.2(h).
Perez, 926 F.3d at 525 (quoting Carver, 558 F.3d) (internal quotations omitted).
122
Id. at 525–26.
123
Carver, 558 F.3d at 881 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
124
Id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
125
Litigants to an appeal or procedure may suggest that the matter be heard “en banc”—that
is, by all active judges of the court. W. Pac. R. R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R. R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 261
(1953). The court may also propose an en banc proceeding “sua sponte”—on its own motion. See W.
Pac. R. R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R. R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 262 (1953).
126
Perez, 926 F.3d at 525 (citing Carver, 558 F.3d at 881 (Reinhardt, J., concurring)).
127
Id. at 526 (Molloy, J., dissenting).
128
Id. (Molloy, J., dissenting).
129
Id. at 527 (Molloy, J., dissenting) (citing Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706, 709 (2019)).
130
Id. at 526–27 (Molloy, J., dissenting).
121
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by a quorum of the panel judges it is no longer under submission,” and
General Order 3.2(h) only applies to matters that are “under submission.”131 For this reason, the Perez case was completely decided in
2018.132 If the opinion is incorrect, it should proceed to a rehearing en
banc, and the parties must be provided with the opportunity to be heard
at that proceeding.133
II. PROHIBITING GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION INTO EMPLOYEES’
SEXUAL PRIVACY
The Constitution is credited as conferring upon citizens a general
“right to be let alone.”134 The Court has gradually expanded on this right
by acknowledging that there are zones of individual privacy that should
be free from government interference,135 and, more specifically, that
“choices central to personal dignity and autonomy[ ] are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”136 This “emerging
awareness” culminated in Lawrence with the Court’s acknowledgement
that the right to be let alone extends to all private, consensual, sexual
conduct.137 The original Perez opinion furthers this awareness by urging
caution “not to let the State use its power as an employer to encroach
excessively or unnecessarily upon the areas of private life . . . where an
individual’s dignity interest in autonomy is at its apex.”138
Although Lawrence symbolizes a freedom from governmental influence with regard to individual autonomy generally, it set the stage for the
recognition of those rights in the sphere of public employment specifically.139 A government actor cannot undermine individual liberties
merely because it is acting as an employer as opposed to acting as a
governing body. The cornerstone of this recognition turns on the notion
that government employers can no longer be permitted to take adverse
employment action against an employee who “does not live up to the
employer’s conception of morality in how she lives her private and personal life (especially in matters pertaining to sex).”140 If a government
131

Id. at 527 (Molloy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 528 (9th Cir. 2019) (Molloy, J., dissenting).
133
Id. at 527-28 (9th Cir. 2019) (Molloy, J., dissenting).
134
Omstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
135
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
136
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
137
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
138
Perez, 882 F.3d at 847.
139
See Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 89 (2006).
140
Id. at 89–90.
132
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employer must interfere in the personal off-duty conduct of the individual employee, the employer must be required to show a substantial interest in doing so.141 That is, the government’s interest must be related to
the employment relationship in order to justify its intrusion into the employee’s private life. The employer’s own conception of morality is simply not sufficient to meet this standard.142
A contrary analysis suggests that the principles in Lawrence do not
affect other historically outlawed private conduct, such as adultery.143
This view maintains that the circumstances in Lawrence did not involve
“persons who might be injured,”144 and adultery has the potential of
harming innocent spouses and children.145 To be sure, many states still
criminalize adultery, although it is rarely enforced.146 However, to suggest that Lawrence does not apply to other private sexual activities that
are contrary to the Nation’s history and tradition is to, once again, misinterpret the overall holding in Lawrence. As the Court noted in Lawrence,
history and tradition are merely a starting point, and the evolution of
laws and traditions “show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”147 This language suggests that
the Court intended a broad interpretation of Lawrence, and that the principles acknowledged do not apply exclusively to homosexual sodomy, as
opponents may suggest.148 Rather, the decision in Lawrence promotes a
more general right of the individual to make intimate decisions free from
government interference.149 While even the broadest interpretation of
Lawrence does not exempt all sexual decision-making from government
interference, it does require the government to meet a heightened standard of review when it seeks to limit those decisions.150
141

Id. at 118.
Id. at 126.
143
Matthew W. Green Jr., Lawrence: An Unlikely Catalyst for Massive Disruption in the
Sphere of Government Employee Privacy and Intimate Association Claims, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 311, 338 (2008).
144
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
145
Matthew W. Green Jr., Lawrence: An Unlikely Catalyst for Massive Disruption in the
Sphere of Government Employee Privacy and Intimate Association Claims, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 311, 339 (2008).
146
Jolie Lee, In Which States is Cheating on Your Spouse Illegal?, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
(Apr. 17, 2014, 4:48 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/life/family/2014/04/17/in-which-states-ischeating-on-your-spouse-illegal/28936155/.
147
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72.
148
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“[N]owhere does the court declare
that homosexual sodomy is a fundamental right under the due process clause” (internal quotations
omitted)).
149
See generally, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
150
See generally, id.
142
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As the original decision in Perez acknowledged, Lawrence established a right of all adults to engage in consensual sexual activity, in
whatever form that might take.151 This means that “the State may not
stigmatize private sexual conduct simply because the majority has ‘traditionally viewed a particular practice,’ [including] extramarital sex, ‘as
immoral.’”152 As the Perez court concluded in its initial ruling, a government actor may not use its position as an employer to escape its responsibility to respect an individual’s personal autonomy rights.153
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S SECOND OPINION MISAPPLIES RELEVANT
FACTS, AND MISINTERPRETS RECENT PRECEDENT.
The Ninth Circuit’s 2019 decision is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, it fails to consider the impact of the supervising officers’
disapproving statements about the affair.154 The first memorandum issued to Perez and Begley specifically discussed the unprofessionalism of
their affair and its unfavorable reflection on the police department.155
Further, Hahn, Moore, and Walstad all testified as to their personal feelings about the affair.156 These testimonies suggest that the officers could
have been motivated to terminate Perez, at least in part, because of their
disapproval of her affair.157
Secondly, the Ninth Circuit’s 2019 opinion affords no weight to the
suspicious timing of Perez’s reprimand for violating the department’s
phone policies.158 The phone policy reprimand, which the court points to
as the ultimate justification for Perez’s termination, was issued nearly a
week after her termination.159 The original reprimand, which cited the
unprofessional nature of Perez’s sexual relationship, was thereafter removed from her file.160 The “shifting justifications for [Perez’s] termination” present, at the very least, a questionable issue of fact as to the true
reason for Perez’s termination.161
151
See Perez, 882 F.3d at 856 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578) (“the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause must extend equally to all intimate sexual conduct between consenting
adults”).
152
Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
153
See id.
154
See id. at 851–53.
155
Id. at 853.
156
Id. at 852–53.
157
See id.
158
See Perez, 926 F.3d at 517–18.
159
Id. at 518.
160
Id.
161
Perez, 882 F.3d at 854.
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Finally, by considering its decisions in Fugate and Fleisher, in conjunction with its conclusions in Thorne, the court finds that the officers
could not have been expected to know that terminating Perez because of
her extramarital affair would violate Perez’s constitutional rights.162
However, Fugate and Fleisher were distinguished from Thorne,163 and
are likewise distinguishable from Perez.164 Perez neither conducted an
on-duty sexual relationship, nor engaged in criminal sexual misconduct.165 While the Ninth Circuit concluded in its 2019 opinion that Perez
was ultimately terminated for excessive cell phone use in connection
with her affair, Chief Hahn specifically stated that her cell phone use was
not a violation warranting termination.166 Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit
originally concluded, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the
“affair had any meaningful impact upon [Perez’s] job performance.”167
Thorne is therefore directly applicable here, and establishes that a government employer cannot base termination decisions on an employee’s
off-duty sexual conduct, when such conduct does not impact her on-thejob performance.168
Furthermore, as Judge Molloy acknowledged in his dissenting opinion, “the substitution of a judge who legitimately disagrees with the original opinion should not change the outcome” of the case.169 The Ninth
Circuit’s 2019 opinion offers a different interpretation of the facts, which
at the very least, suggests a triable issue sufficient to defeat summary
judgment.170 By avoiding the privacy and associational questions in162

Perez, 926 F.3d at 522.

163

Compare Thorne, 726 F.2d at 471 (holding that a employer may not rely on an employee’s off-duty, private conduct in withholding employment, when such conduct does not impact
her on-the-job performance or violate a specific department policy), with Fugate, 791 F.2d at 741
(holding that while Thorne protected sexual behavior occurring off-duty, it does not protect officers’
privacy when such behavior occurs “on-the-job”), and Fleisher, 829 F.2d at 1499 (holding that the
Thorne protections do not apply to actions that are specifically identified by the employer as being
grounds for termination).
164

Compare Perez, 882 F.3d at 857 n.10 (holding that neither adverse action, nor termination
may be sought against an employee based on her off-duty, private sexual conduct when such conduct
does not affect her job performance or violate a narrowly-tailored regulation), with Fugate, 791 F.2d
at 741 (holding that privacy protections for an employee’s off-duty conduct do not apply when the
employee engages in sexual conduct while on-duty), and Fleisher, 829 F.2d at 1499 (holding that an
employee’s privacy rights are not violated when he is terminated for engaging in sexual conduct that
is specifically prohibited by the department’s established policies).
165

See Perez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80060, at *29–30.

166

Perez, 926 F.3d at 518.

167

Perez, 882 F.3d at 854–55.

168

Thorne, 726 F.2d at 471.

169

Perez, 926 F.3d at 526 (Molloy, J. dissenting).

170

See Perez, 882 F.3d at 858.
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volved in this case, the Ninth Circuit misses an opportunity to clarify an
issue that has not been definitively resolved since Lawrence. 171
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S CONCLUSIONS IN ITS FIRST OPINION
APPROPRIATELY APPLY CONTROLLING PRECEDENT AND
APPROPRIATELY INTERPRET THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions in its 2019 opinion, the
question here is not whether a government employer can ever consider
an employee’s sexual activity when making employment decisions.172
Rather, this case asks whether the employer can consider the employee’s
off-duty conduct, when it does not substantially affect her job
performance.173
In its initial opinion, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Lawrence to recognize that “intimate sexual conduct represents an aspect of substantive
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”174 Because Perez’s commanding officers stated that they morally disapproved of the affair, and
considering that the Department’s proffered reasons for Perez’s termination175 came in quick succession after the internal affairs investigation,
there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the termination was uncon171

See generally, Perez, 882 F.3d 843; Seegmiller, 528 F.3d 762; Coker, 858 F.3d 304.
See Perez, 926 F.3d at 520.
173
See Perez, 882 F.3d at 848.
174
Id. at 856 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564). Although Perez’s other claims are not the
subject of this Note, they are illustrative of her plight as a public employee, and perhaps worthy of
further research. First, while Perez conceded that her termination was based on her affair with another officer (see Perez, 926 F.3d at 515), her observations of sex discrimination by the Department
were plausible. Specifically, Perez noted that Begley, who was equally engaged in an extramarital
affair with a fellow officer, was neither terminated because of the affair, nor reprimanded as a result
of a “heated exchange” with his superiors. Plaintiff-Appellant Janelle Perez’s Opening Brief at 22,
Perez, 926 F.3d 511 (No. 15-16430). Conversely, Perez was both terminated at least in part for the
affair, and retroactively reprimanded for having a “bad attitude” with a supervisor. Id. at 22.
Second, the court concluded that, even if Perez’s due process rights were violated with the
disclosure of the disciplinary action against her to Begley’s wife, the Department was entitled to
qualified immunity, as there was no clearly set standard for determining a sufficient nexus between
the public revelation and the termination. Perez, 926 F.3d at 524. In an earlier case, the court found
there was not a sufficient nexus when a stigmatizing statement was released 19 days after the employee’s termination. Id. at 524 (citing Tibbetts v. Kulongoski, 567 F.3d 529, 538 (9th Cir. 2009)).
The court concluded that the same standard should apply to this case, given that the disclosure to
Begley’s wife occurred 19 days before Perez’s termination. Id. This is arguably an incorrect application, as a disclosure of stigmatizing information after the employee’s termination could have a significantly different effect on the termination decision than would the same disclosure occurring
before the termination. In absence of a “bright line rule[,]” there is no clear guidance on how to
evaluate similar facts going forward. Id.
175
The Department cited the following as reasons for Perez’s termination: (1) she did not get
along with other female officers; (2) the Department received a complaint about her from a domestic
violence victim; and (3) she had a “bad attitude[.]” Perez, 882 F.3d at 853 (9th Cir. 2018).
172
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stitutionally motivated.176 Further, the fact that the Department withdrew
its reprimand for “Unsatisfactory Work Performance” and “Conduct Unbecoming” and replaced it with a reprimand for “Use of Communication
Devices” only after Perez had been terminated, despite noting that Perez’s cell-phone use did not “warrant[ ] termination,”177 raises questions
regarding the true motive for the Department’s actions.
The Lawrence Court found that individuals have a right to engage in
private sexual conduct without intrusion by the government.178 Nowhere
in the Lawrence opinion does the Court specify that this principle applies
to a government actor only when it is acting as a sovereign. Nor does the
Lawrence opinion only apply to homosexual conduct.179 Because of
these omissions, the Ninth Circuit inferred that a state actor cannot hide
behind the guise of “employer” in order to stigmatize a particular sexual
activity based exclusively on its own traditional views of morality.180
Even if the right to engage in private sexual conduct is not fundamental, and therefore not entitled to a heightened degree of scrutiny, the
Ninth Circuit concluded early on that government intrusion into an employee’s privacy and associational rights when not relevant to her on-thejob performance could not withstand “any level of scrutiny.”181 Thus, a
government employer’s invasion of an individual’s rights to privacy and
free association can only be appropriate upon a showing that the employee’s conduct has had an adverse effect on his or her job performance, or violates a narrowly–tailored, constitutionally-sound
departmental policy.182
It is certainly important that a police department maintain order
within the department, as well as the confidence of the public it serves.
However, the right to engage in private, sexual conduct free of government intervention is arguably more important, regardless of whether the
government is acting as a sovereign or as an employer. Furthermore, employment with law enforcement does not minimize an employee’s right
to personal autonomy.183 Because the state cannot “demean [an individual’s] existence” by penalizing their private sexual conduct,184 a government employer must show “more than a de minimis adverse impact on
176

Id.
Id. at 850.
178
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
179
See id.
180
See Perez, 882 F.3d at 856.
181
Thorne, 726 F.2d at 471 (emphasis added).
182
See Perez, 882 F.3d at 856.
183
See, e.g., Steve Hartsoe, ACLU Challenges N.C. Cohabitation Law, WASH. POST (May 10,
2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/09/AR2005050901091.
html.
184
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
177
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the employer’s work place” to justify an unwanted interference.185 As the
initial Perez opinion suggests, “[c]onduct unbecoming an officer” is not
a legitimate reason to permit the State’s intrusion on an individual’s
rights to privacy and free association.186
V. THE INITIAL PEREZ TEST SHOULD BE USED AS A MODEL FOR
FUTURE CASES.
It is not surprising that the government is generally prohibited from
conditioning a government benefit on the surrender of a constitutional
right.187 However, the government employer stands in the unique position of controlling the terms and conditions of employment.188 Moreover,
the government employer has an interest in providing an efficient and
responsive government service.189 Nonetheless, discipline or termination
of a government employee solely on the basis of moral disapproval of
their off-duty conduct is constitutionally impermissible.190
The Perez and Thorne decisions account for this by providing a
workable standard for analyzing similar situations going forward.191 To
withstand heightened scrutiny, the state actor must first identify a legitimate interest: while maintaining an effective government service may be
a legitimate interest, moral disapproval of private conduct is not.192 Second, the policy must be narrowly-tailored to achieve that interest: the
government must show that the employee’s conduct either interferes with
her on-the-job performance or violates a constitutionally valid department regulation.193
185
Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 85, 124 (2006).
186

Perez, 882 F.3d at 856. See also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.

187

See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that if a university’s decision
not to renew a teacher’s contract was based upon the teachers exercise of his free speech rights, such
a decision would violate the Due Process clause).
188
See Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 97 (2006).
189
See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (holding that a government may not rescind or decline to renew an at-will contract with an independent contractor in
retaliation for exercising his free speech rights).
190
Perez, 882 F.3d at 848.
191
Id. at 857–58 (citing Thorne, 726 F.2d at 471.
192
Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 85, 132 n.237 (2006).
193
Perez, 882 F.3d at 857-858 (citing Thorne, 726 F.2d at 471).
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Incidentally, there are circumstances when government interference
with an employee’s personal autonomy rights would be justified.194 Generally, these circumstances would involve some “detriment to the employer’s public image, the inability of the worker to interact with her coemployees, or the employee’s simple inability to carry out the essential
functions of her position as a result of her private conduct.”195 For example, some government employers have regulations in place that would
meet the standard set forth by Perez, meaning that an employer could
base a personnel decision on an employee’s private sexual activity.196
Such a decision, however, would not be overtly based upon the government’s moral disapproval of the employees’ conduct. Rather, the government’s decision would be a response to an actual or potential negative
impact to the work environment.
For example, some employers have specific departmental policies
against nepotism,197 which provide for comparable reassignment in the
event that a personal relationship exists within certain employment relationships.198 If the City of Roseville had a similar provision in place, it
would not have violated Perez’s privacy and associational interests by
transferring her to another police department. Similarly, California government employees are prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, including using the prestige of the agency for the employee’s private
advantage; misusing state time or resources; and misusing confidential
information.199 In this regard, if Perez actually engaged in sexual activity
while on duty, the department would have been permitted to terminate
her without violating her sexual autonomy rights. Dereliction of duty is a
legitimate reason to dismiss an employee; moral disapproval of their sexual decisions is not.
These regulations satisfy the Perez requirements because they are
narrowly–tailored and constitutionally sound.200 Moreover, neither of
194

Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 85, 124 (2006).
195
Id.
196
See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF HUMAN RES., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
AND CAL FIRE LOCAL 2881 COVERING BARGAINING UNIT 8 FIREFIGHTERS, 23 (2017), http://
calhr.ca.gov/labor-relations/Documents/mou-20170101-20210701-bu8.pdf. Accord Paul M.
Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 124
(2006).
197
Id. “Nepotism” is defined as a situation in which one employee uses his or her influence
or power to positively or negatively affect another employee because of a personal relationship
between them.
198
See, e.g., id.
199
CAL. GOV. CODE § 19990 (2018).
200
See generally Perez, 882 F.3d at 857–58 (citing Thorne, 726 F.2d at 471).
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these examples involves a subjective, purely moral limit on the employee’s off-duty conduct, such as a requirement not to engage in “immoral or indecent conduct,”201 or to “keep [one’s] private life
unsullied.”202
VI. APPLICATION OF THE PEREZ TEST MAY HAVE CAUSED THE FIFTH
AND TENTH CIRCUITS TO DECIDE DIFFERENTLY.
The courts in Seegmiller and Coker misapplied the principles announced in Lawrence when they concluded that the asserted rights were
anything less than personal rights to sexual autonomy, and were thus not
fundamental. Although the police departments may have ultimately been
able to show that their work-related interests were sufficient to survive
heightened scrutiny, analyzing such rights under a rational basis review
was not appropriate.
Application of the Perez standard to the Seegmiller case would
likely have resulted in a favorable decision for the police department.
Like California, Utah also expressly prohibits government employees
from using state resources for private gain.203 While the Perez standard
recognizes that Officer Johnson had a constitutional right to make personal intimate decisions,204 it does not support a conclusion that she had
a right to use department resources to her own advantage. By engaging in
an extramarital affair while at a department-sponsored event, the department could have determined that Officer Johnson was in violation of a
narrowly–tailored department regulation.
Conversely, the decision in Coker would likely have favored officers, if the court applied the Perez test.205 Despite the Fifth Circuit’s
determination that the officers did not “have constitutional rights to ‘associate’ with [the] other’s spouse,” there was no evidence that the officers’ decisions to engage in private, consensual, sexual conduct
affected their respective on-the-job performances.206 Furthermore, the
Sheriff’s Department Code of Conduct was neither narrowly–tailored,
nor constitutionally valid, as it merely prohibited subjectively “immoral”
conduct.207

201

Coker, 858 F.3d at 305.
Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 772.
203
UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 477-9-3 (2018).
204
Perez, 882 F.3d at 856 (citing Thorne, 726 F.2d at 471).
205
See generally Perez, 882 F.3d at 857-58 (citing Thorne, 726 F.2d at 471).
206
Coker, 858 F.3d at 306.
207
Id. at 305.
202
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CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence regarding personal autonomy shows that individuals have a right to make decisions about their private and personal lives
free from unwanted government intrusion.208 Some circuit courts are resistant to the broad application of sexual autonomy rights identified in
Lawrence v. Texas.209 Those courts maintain that Lawrence was not intended to extend an unfettered right to sexual privacy;210 and even if it
did, that right was certainly not meant to apply to public employment.211
This is not a proper understanding of the Lawrence decision.
As the Ninth Circuit initially acknowledged in Perez v. Roseville,
Lawrence stood for the notion that the Constitution protects individual
autonomy in all areas of sexual decision-making.212 It is not a proper
application of the law to conclude that a government actor, acting as an
employer, does not have to abide by the same constitutional protections
that guide the government actor acting as a sovereign. In Perez, the
Ninth Circuit recognized that government employees are nonetheless citizens, and are entitled to protection of those rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.213
The Ninth Circuit’s second decision in Perez is problematic because
it misinterprets the facts and controlling precedent in determining that the
Roseville Police Department did not violate Perez’s constitutional privacy rights.214 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s first opinion should have remained in place.215
While a government employer has an interest in maintaining an efficient government service, the subjective morality of the employer does
not outweigh the employee’s liberty interest in making personal, off-duty
decisions without government interference.216 For these reasons, courts
208
See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (right to engage in private sexual conduct);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (right of married couples to purchase contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972) (right of all couples to purchase contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right to marry, regardless of the race of the
respective individuals); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (right to marry extends
to same sex couples); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (right to
terminate a pregnancy prior to viability).
209
See Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 771. See also Coker, 858 F.3d at 306.
210
Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 771.
211
Coker, 858 F.3d at 306.
212
Perez, 882 F.3d at 856.
213
See generally id.
214
Compare Perez, 926 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2019) with Perez, 882 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2018).
215
See Perez, 926 F.3d at 526 (Molloy, J., dissenting).
216
Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 85, 126 (2006).
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should adopt the Perez standard, which provides that an employee may
only be subject to adverse employment action for their off-duty conduct
when such conduct substantially interferes with their on-the-job performance, or violates a narrowly–tailored, constitutionally valid department
policy.217 This test appropriately balances the government’s interest in
effective service against the employee’s interest in individual autonomy.
Applying this standard, courts in other jurisdictions would have decided
similar cases different
An individual does not relinquish their constitutionally-protected
personal autonomy rights when they accept the benefit of public service.
Nor is a state actor permitted to compromise individual liberties, merely
because it is acting as an employer. The public employee remains a citizen, and the State cannot be allowed to use its position as an employer to
subject her to its own perceptions about morality.

217

Perez, 882 F.3d at 855–56 (citing Thorne, 726 F.2d at 471).
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